Tuesday, March 31, 2015

Pukka Firewall Lessons from Jamie Oliver

Pukka Firewall Lessons from Jamie Oliver

In our office I’m willing to bet that food is discussed on average three times a day. Monday mornings will be spent waxing lyrical about the culinary masterpiece we’ve managed to prepare over the weekend. Then at around 11 someone will say, “Where are we going for lunch?” Before going home that evening, maybe there’s a question about the latest eatery in town. 

I expect your office chit chat is not too dissimilar to ours, because food and what we do with it has skyrocketed in popularity over the past few years. Cookery programmes like Jamie Oliver's 30 minute meals, the Great British Bake-off and Masterchef have been a big influence. 

Our food obsession, however, might be putting us all at risk, and I don’t just mean from an expanded waistline. Cyber criminals appear to have turned their attention to the food industry, targeting Jamie Oliver’s website with malware. This is the second time that malware has been found on site. News originally broke back in February, and the problem was thought to have been resolved. Then, following a routine site inspection on the 13th of March, webmasters found that the malware had returned or had never actually been completely removed. 

It’s no surprise that cyber criminals have associated themselves with Jamie Oliver, since they’ve been leeching on pop culture and celebrities for years. Back in 2008, typing a star’s name into a search engine and straying away from the official sites was a sure fire way to get malware. Now it seems they’ve cut out the middleman, going straight to the source. This malware was planted directly onto JamieOliver.com.

Apart from bad press, Jamie Oliver has come away unscathed. Nobody has been seriously affected and the situation could have been much worse had the malware got into an organisational network. 

Even with no real damage there’s an important lesson to be learned. Keep your firewall up to date so it can identify nefarious code contained within web pages or applications. If such code tries to execute itself on your machine, a good firewall will identify this as malware.

Wednesday, March 18, 2015

5 Important Lessons from the Judges Who Were Caught Watching Porn


5 Important Lessons from the judges who were caught watching porn

I've never been in court before or stood in a witness box, and I hope I never do. If I am, however, called before a judge, I’d expect him or her to be donning a funny wig and a gown, to be above average intelligence, and to judge my case fairly according to the law of the land. What I would not expect is for that judge to be indulging while in the office, as these District Judges have done. Four of Her Majesty’s finest have been caught watching porn on judicial owned IT equipment. While, the material didn't contain illegal content or child images, it’s easy to see why the case has attracted so much media attention. I mean, it’s the kind of behaviour you would expect from a group of lads on a stag, not from a District Judge! Now the shoe is on the other foot, and questions will be asked about how a porn culture was allowed to develop at the highest levels of justice. Poor web usage controls and lack of communication were more than likely to blame. But speculation aside, the world may have passed the point where opportunity can remain unrestricted to allow things like this to happen. Employees, especially those in high positions, are more vulnerable and need protection. So here are 5 important lessons on web filtering from 4 District Judges: 1. Know Your Organisational Risk – The highest levels of staff pose the highest risk to the organisation. Failures on their part risk the credibility of the whole organisation. 2. Recognise Individual Risk – While not always the case, veteran leadership may be the least computer literate and risk stumbling into ill-advised territory accidentally. 3. Communicate with Staff – Notification of acceptable use policies can go a long way to getting everyone on the same page and help with legal recourse when bad things do happen. 4. Be Proactive – Use a web filter for what’s not acceptable instead of leaving that subject matter open to traffic. If you still want to give your staff some flexibility, try out a limit-to-quota feature. 5. Trust No One (Blindly) – Today’s internet environment makes a blind, trust-based relationship foolish. There is simply too much shady stuff out there and much of it is cleverly disguised. If there is anyone out there who’s reading and thinking, this would never happen in my organisation; my staff would never do that, think again, my friend. Nobody is perfect; the ability to look at inappropriate content knows no bounds, including the heights of hierarchy. We’re all potential infringers, as proved by Judges Timothy Bowles, Warren Grant, Peter Bullock and Andrew Maw.

Thursday, March 5, 2015

Statement: Smoothwall and the "FREAK" Vulnerability

In light of the recent "FREAK" vulnerability, in which web servers and web browsers can be cajoled into using older, more vulnerable ciphers in encrypted communications, we would like to assure customers that the web server configuration on an up-to-date Smoothwall system is not vulnerable to this attack.

Similarly, if you are using "HTTPS Decrypt & Inspect" in Smoothwall, your clients' browsers will afforded some protection from attack, as their traffic will be re-encrypted by the web filter, which does not support downgrading to these "Export Grade" ciphers.

Wednesday, March 4, 2015

Searching Safely When HTTPS is Mandatory

Searching Safely when HTTPS is Mandatory


Nobody wants anyone looking at their search history. I get it. I mean, look at mine  —oh wait, don't—that's quite embarrassing. Those were for a friend, honestly.

Fortunately for us, it's pretty difficult to dig into someone's search history. Google even forces you to log in again before you can view it in its entirety. Most search engines now encrypt our traffic by default, too —some even using HSTS to make sure our browsers always go secure. This is great news for consumers, and means our privacy is protected (with the noticeable exception of the search provider, who knows everything and owns your life, but that's another story).

This all comes a little unstuck though - sometimes we want to be able to see inside searches. In a web filtered environment it is really useful to be able to do this. Not just in schools where it's important to prevent searches for online games during lessons, but also in the corporate world where, at the very least, it would be prudent to cut out searches for pornographic terms. It's not that difficult to come up with a handful of search terms that give potentially embarrassing image results.

So, how can we prevent users running wild with search engines? The first option is to secure all HTTPS traffic with "decrypt and inspect" type technology —your Smoothwall can do this, but you will need to distribute a certificate to all who want to use your network to browse the web. This certificate tells the browser: "trust this organisation to look at my secure traffic and do the right thing". This will get all the bells and whistles we were used to in the halcyon days of HTTP: SafeSearch, thumbnail blocking, and search term filtering and reporting.

Full decryption isn't as easy when the device in question is user-owned. The alternative option here is to force SafeSearch (Google let us do this without decrypting HTTPS) but it does leave you at their mercy in terms of SafeSearch. This will block anything that's considered porn, but will leave a fair chunk of "adult" content and doesn't intend to cover subjects such as gambling —or indeed online games. You won't be able to report on any of this either, of course.

Some people ask "can we redirect to the HTTP site" - this is a "downgrade attack", and exactly what modern browsers will spot, and prevent us from doing. We also get asked "can we resolve DNS differently, and send secure traffic to a server we have the cert for?" - well, yes, you can, but the browser will spot this too. You won't get a certificate for "google.com", and that's where the browser thinks it is going, so that's where it expects the certificate to be for.

In conclusion: ideally, you MITM or you force Google's SafeSearch & block access to other search engines. For more information read our whitepaper: 'The Risks of Secure Google Search'. It examines the problems associated with mandatory Google HTTPS searches, and suggests methods which can be used to remedy these issues.